The New Phase of Wars and Militarization in the Middle East

A Call for Rebuilding Internationalism  and Anti-War Campaigns

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Roud Media Collective / June 20, 2025

Introduction۱

Israel’s invasion of Iran has ignited yet another war in the Middle East, making it even harder to articulate the region’s disastrous situation. Amidst the inexpressible rage and anxiety that grips us, how can anything meaningful be conveyed in a polarized and chaotic environment, shaped by public fear, emotional outbursts, nationalist sentiments, and propaganda from states, mainstream media, and reactionary forces? We must, therefore, clarify our intended audience. Our primary audience consists of the left and progressive forces committed to standing against the suffering of the oppressed and exploited peoples of the Middle East. Given circumstances that have severed our direct social and political ties with these masses, we do not expect this text to reach them directly, particularly as this war impedes their struggle for freedom and social justice, amplifying their suffering and misery. Yet, we know activists committed to ending this suffering persist. Secondly, this text addresses all free individuals who, in recent decades, have observed their own states’ participation and complicity in numerous wars with anger, helplessness, or at least disbelief. The complicity of many states, notably the unconditional support of Western governments, in Israel’s 20-month slaughter, destruction, and genocide in Gaza, exemplifies this process.

What, then, is the purpose of this text? Our immediate aim is to strengthen a political stance that views the fight against war-mongering and the “global war regime” as integral to establishing internationalist resistance against the rising wave of global neo-fascism. In our view, the rise of neo-fascism is not limited to the emergence of far-right governments, parties, and movements; it is fundamentally linked to the growth of mechanisms that—in response to the escalation of multi-layered and pervasive crises of contemporary capitalism—not only systematically promote the dehumanization of specific human groups but also normalize these processes. Israel’s ongoing 20-month war and genocide in Gaza, unfolding before the world’s eyes, is clear evidence of this new wave of neo-fascism, which, by its expanding logic, is not confined to a specific geographic or political sphere. Thus, this text aims to amplify the voices and approaches deeply committed to standing against this global trend and to create an active collective agency for resistance. This resistance from below places no hope in states, their policies۲ , or intergovernmental institutions (the so-called “global community”), fundamentally opposing the imperialist and state-centered relations that have established and nourished this global hell to feed capital’s poisonous roots.

This text does not merely condemn Israel’s war-mongering or express urgent demands; many comrades have already issued valuable statements and raised significant demands. Instead, we aim to address a shortcoming which, from our perspective, hinders credible declarations and progressive actions from gaining effective backing. This historic shortcoming, in our view, is the disorganization of the Left in the Middle East (specifically) and the general lack of revolutionary and internationalist strategies (in organized forms). While condemning war, raising urgent demands, or mobilizing to attract global attention are minimally necessary actions in confronting conflicts like the Gaza war, invasion on Iran etc., they are apparently insufficient. The failed response to the Gaza catastrophe demonstrates the need for alternative collective structures and resistance strategies. Thus, the core idea we advocate—and what the world, heading towards degeneration, truly needs—is strengthening comprehensive anti-capitalist internationalism through transnational cooperation against war and the “global war regime”. As a collective of exiled leftists from the Middle East (specifically Iran), we seek to share our understanding of the foundations and implications of Israel’s recent war-mongering with comrades in the Middle East and friends further afield. We aim to clarify why, without establishing such alternative internationalism, everyone is condemned to passively witness capitalism’s suicidal process and the intensification of suffering and destruction across the Middle East and the entire world. This text, while outlining the current horrific situation’s circumstances and implications, also critically examines a strategy among a segment of radical left forces in the Middle East (and beyond). This approach—by focusing solely on the militarist and inhumane policies of the Zionist (Israeli) government and abstracting it from other regional calamities—has hindered the expansion of internationalist solidarity with Middle Eastern peoples’ struggles. This approach has maintained hegemonic influence over internationalist left discourse and practices within the Palestine solidarity movement since the onset of the Gaza war. Now, with Israel’s invasion of Iran (followed by the U.S. invasion) and the resulting disastrous consequences for the Middle East, this approach has become even more prominent۳ . Against such an approach, this text aims to demonstrate both the necessity and feasibility of developing an internationalist strategy centered on “The Third Way” [۱].

I. Motivations for Israel’s War-Mongering and Iran’s War-Drive

From a broad perspective, the states of Israel and Iran, throughout their respective histories, are functioning based on inhumane principles and policies. For both, the presence of an objective external enemy serves as a convenient means to evade accountability or as a pretext to suppress popular resistance and social movements. Through ongoing confrontations with such external enemies, they advance their strategic agendas, justifying and perpetuating an indefinite “state of emergency”. For over four decades, these two regimes have played this mutually beneficial role for each other. In specific phases of their continuous confrontations, military threats have escalated into severe tensions and even direct military conflicts. The inherent risks and consequences of these episodic wars—or the threats thereof—validate their “enemy-centered” state strategies in the eyes of public opinion. By inciting public fear and nationalist emotions, they pave the way for the continued application of these strategies, thereby perpetuating their own reproduction.

While Israel’s recent military invasion has been justified by Israeli rulers and their international allies with the perceived objective danger of Iran’s “nuclear capabilities” to Israel’s very existence, the Islamic Republic of Iran (from here on, the IR), conversely, has interpreted this military attack as clear evidence supporting its right to insist on maintaining and expanding its nuclear and missile strategy. Each regime, by resorting to threats or aggression from the other, seeks to legitimize a fragmented and distorted narrative of its own historical record and overall orientation. The more horrific the threat or invasion from the opposing side, the greater the chance for either to gain such legitimacy and expand its audience. These two regimes, in their efforts to reproduce their power foundations and pursue specific regional interests, are integral parts of the mechanisms advancing a “global war regime”. This regime has itself emerged from the ongoing, multilateral crises of contemporary capitalism. The “global war regime” functions as a response to crisis-driven threats to capital accumulation—such as rising mass resistance and limited access to resources and markets—but at the same time, it is a product of increased rivalry among current imperialist blocs, while also intensifying that rivalry.

From a more specific perspective, both the Israeli and Iranian regimes have experienced turbulent and fragile periods in recent years. Within approximately 18 months following the Hamas attack on October 7, the Israeli government managed to carry out its military crimes and Zionist expansionism in Gaza under the banner of a “right to self-defense” against the “objective threat of Hamas terrorism.” During this period, it enjoyed unlimited support from global powers, particularly the U.S. and its NATO allies. Meanwhile, people globally remained relatively passive, observing this state-led process of genocide and ethnic cleansing, often ignoring protests that were criminalized and suppressed by these same supporting states. Within Israel itself—despite Netanyahu’s unpopularity—the “blessing of war,” fueled by state propaganda about the “danger of Palestinians,” had somewhat aligned public opinion. However, as the intrinsic disinterest of Netanyahu’s government in establishing a ceasefire became apparent, coupled with the increasingly evident human toll of this unequal war, and especially the overt use of hunger as a weapon of war from mid-March 2025, a significant shift occurred in global public opinion, making it more difficult to sustain unconditional support for Israel’s “defensive operations”.

The disastrous war Israel waged under the slogan of “right to self-defense” suddenly lost much of its international legitimacy. Opposing voices within global Jewish communities increased, and even inside Israel, opposition and protests against the government’s war strategies intensified. (Although, according to some statistical surveys, a significant portion of the opposition within Israel to continue the war was not out of sympathy for Palestinians but aimed at freeing the hostages.) In such conditions, Israel’s far-right government could no longer exploit the unique opportunity it had gained from Hamas’s catastrophic attack to push toward its very end—the final depopulation and annexation of Gaza.

However, in this critical context, the conjunction and succession of three factors provided Israel with a pretext or opportunity to escape this deadlock: first, the IR’s refusal to limit its nuclear ambitions [2]; second, the announcement of the acquisition of sensitive documents regarding Israel’s nuclear facilities by the IR; and third, the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Board of Governors condemning the IR for non-compliance. Israel’s desperate and opportunistic government welcomed this situation to initiate a new war, effectively turning the so-called threats into opportunities for advancement. It should be noted that, according to subsequent reports from Israeli military sources, the military invasion of Iran had long been on Israel’s agenda, and some preparations for this move—even within Iran—had already been made. The rationale behind weakening Iran’s military and imposing socio-political instability in that territory was manifold:

  1. it would pave the way for Israel’s hegemonic control over future regional arrangements;
  2. it would align with Israel’s territorial expansion ambitions, a core component of the Zionist strategy; and
  3. it would cement Israel’s political-military apparatus as the provider of victory over a “long-standing and dangerous enemy”.

The only remaining question was timing, which, after Israel’s war in Gaza, the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and regime change in Syria (to Iran’s detriment), seemed to have arrived. In this sense, Israel’s military aggression against Iran, as far as the intentions of its rulers are concerned, was part of a deliberate plan by the Israeli government, justified and pretexted by baseless claims. These claims could not have gained international traction without the IR’s irresponsible, reckless, and inhumane policies in the Middle East, nor without the unconditional support of global powers.

Regarding Iran, the IR approached the brink of collapse with the widespread Jina (Mahsa) uprising, and despite its bloody repression, it has not yet freed itself from some of the antagonistic residues of this upheaval. Over the past two decades, the accumulation of internal and external crises has increasingly driven Iran toward reliance on militarism, nuclear and missile policies, and an aggressive geostrategic approach under the “geopoliticizing of Shi’ism.” Recently, this process has been influenced by three major shifts:

  1. Due to regional consequences of the Gaza war, Iran’s geostrategic plans in the region, known as the “Axis of Resistance,” have been significantly weakened—although Israel’s obvious crimes and international immunity during this war have inadvertently increased the propaganda legitimacy of the Islamic Republic’s longstanding regional narrative;
  2. Following an implicit agreement among imperialist poles, Iran was suddenly and humiliatingly expelled from its regional base in Syria, a key implementer of proxy wars among imperialist powers; and shortly afterward,
  3. With the resurgence of Trump’s influence, Iran’s regime faced increasing U.S. pressures, pushing it closer to accepting a “restrictive” nuclear deal.

In these conditions, Iran—as it had demonstrated in previous short and largely indirect military confrontations—was not interested in engaging in a full-scale military conflict with Israel, especially knowing it would face Israel’s military alongside U.S. and Western allies. Nonetheless, Iran continued to play its part, based on its inhumane foundations and the hubris of its rulers, at the expense of the Iranian people and the broader Middle East. Moreover, after Israel’s sudden attack on Iran (with the green light and support of its Western allies), IR will likely find space to:

  • Justify its reactionary strategies domestically, regionally, and globally, claiming victimhood and legitimacy, and seeking new opportunities for recovery and pursuit.
  • Deepen its reliance on Iranian nationalism to marginalize progressive forces.
  • More aggressively pursue militarism (and possibly its nuclear plan).
  • Suppress resistance, protests, and social movements within the country with increased brutality.

It is no coincidence that the IR’s initial reactions to Israel’s military invasion have included: restricting internet access; issuing security warnings to political and civil activists against any critical enlightenment; increasing security pressures on political prisoners; preemptive arrests of political activists; resorting to nationalist discourse and symbols; rising racist pressures and accusations against Afghan immigrants/refugees, coupled with increased mass detention and deportation; and amplifying the idea of gaining military superiority (or the necessity of acquiring nuclear weapons and expanding missile technologies) to protect the “nation” and the “territorial homeland”. [۳]

II. War-Mongering and War-Drive in the Context of Global Capitalism

The trajectory of capitalism over recent decades has been accompanied by a series of intensified, intertwined crises. Even those who do not conceptually recognize capitalism as a comprehensive historical process have felt the pervasive effects of these crises in various ways, becoming somewhat aware of the unjust nature of the current state or the bleakness of future prospects. This awareness stems from consequences such as the climate crisis, economic downturns and austerity policies, the rise of far-right tendencies, othering, and militarism, or the wave of wars and militarism and their public impacts on the insecurity of life conditions. More precisely than the general populace, the ruling elites—both state and economic (capitalists)—are fully aware of the depth and implications of this crisis. Crucially, the constraining impact of these crises has imposed new conditions on the configuration of dominant power structures, from states to multinational corporations.

The reorganization of the neoliberal global order—itself a large-scale, structural response to the crisis of the previous Fordist accumulation model and to remanage global relations—has, less than three decades after its triumphant emergence, become a source of deeper and broader crises. The precursors to these crises appeared in the 2008 economic crisis, as predicted by Marxist critique of capitalist political economy. Another significant consequence of this new phase of crisis is the escalation of inter-imperialist rivalry and conflicts. This escalation was first evident in the intensification of competition and hostility between Russia and the West, particularly in proxy wars across Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Sudan. It became more tangible with Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, and finally, with the growing hegemonic rivalries between China and the United States (and its Western allies), it has become an obvious, defining reality. The horrific war Israel initiated in Gaza unfolded within this historical framework and has continued unconditionally and uncontrollably. However, the proliferation of wars and the growth of militarism and war-mongering are not merely manifestations of intensified inter-imperialist conflicts. Instead, the main function of wars is the reorganization of the global order in such a way that, alongside the “successful” pursuit of intensified and unavoidable hegemonic conflicts, the requirements of capital accumulation amid ongoing crises can be realized. This realization occurs in four main ways:

  • Channeling increasingly more infrastructure and resources of national economies toward militarism, which is linked to the infrastructure and accumulated investments during the Cold War and the subsequent phase of “War on Terror”. This orientation, which significantly shaped the structure of national economies within capitalist centers, aims to enhance ‘national capacity’ to confront escalating, inevitable struggles for global hegemony and to access resources (natural and markets) that are becoming increasingly scarce in the post-globalization crises.
  • Expanding the strategy of “creative destruction” through the military destruction of urban and industrial infrastructure. This mechanism, while consuming accumulated military goods, creates the conditions for future economic investments and intensifies regional arms races, thereby increasing global demand for weapons.
  • Upgrading military technology through the practical testing of existing weapons and the latest military technologies.
  • Enhancing the capacities of global powers and regional petty powers (as subcontractors of imperialist forces) to suppress the growing resistance of oppressed and exploited masses. This is because the expansion of militarism by states increases their repressive dominance over the movements of oppressed populations—vast, heterogeneous masses who, alongside increasing proletarianization due to neoliberal dispossession, bear the main burden of capitalism’s crises and, in various forms and levels, resist and protest. The post-2008 crisis world has not only seen an aggressive advance of capitalism and its metamorphosis into authoritarian forms but also witnessed a rise in mass protests: from the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, the Indignados movement in Spain, Syriza in Greece, the Sudanese revolution, the anti-austerity uprisings of 2019 in the Global South, the Yellow Vests movement, and a series of mass uprisings in Sudan and Iran, culminating in the “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising.

What has been described above is a summary of the foundations and characteristics of the “global war regime”. In such a world, the increase in wars, militarism, and war-mongering is not accidental but a structural response of the ruling order to crises that threaten its reproduction. Moreover, this form of aggressive crisis management—a form of “disaster capitalism”—also provides the fluid capacities necessary for global centers of power to overcome unintended obstacles or previous tools that have become barriers. Such fluidity depends on the readiness of imperialist poles for inevitable alignments, exemplified in the power shifts in Syria.

The “green light” given by global powers for Netanyahu’s government to invade Iran stemmed from the stubborn efforts of Iran’s rulers to secure firm guarantees of political stability, despite the changed and fluid conditions of the global order. Iran’s “delusional hubris” was so extensive that, despite Iran’s structural role in advancing the imposed imperialist order in the Middle East and strengthening the global war regime, its current regime, with its nuclear and missile ambitions, has become an obstacle to the current configuration of imperialist forces in this region. The core of the Iranian rulers’ illusions lay in two misconceptions:

  • First, their view of the possibility of maintaining a “half-war” relationship with Israel for a long period. They relied for over four decades on the stability of such a relationship as a political-ideological tool, while simultaneously propagating the destruction of Israel’s existence. This misconception ignored that Israel might unilaterally shift the borders of this longstanding, stable conflict to bring its advantages into a turning point.
  • Second, the mistaken belief that they could always rely on the ongoing conflict between Western and Eastern imperialist centers, maneuvering around this divide while strategically aligning with Eastern imperialist forces. This overlooked the possibility of aligning major powers and abandoning regional partners based on different and dynamic strategic needs. The relative neglect of the Islamic Republic by Russia during the power shifts in Syria was a late but somewhat conscious realization of this.

Thus, this war—in summary and at the macro level—serves two essential structural functions and a third, incidental function:

  • Helping reproduce the global cycles of capital accumulation through militarization.
  • Reshaping the conditions in the Middle East and Iran to disrupt resistance (social movements) and limit their potential for autonomous growth.
  • An adaptable strategy to eliminate (or at least, modulate) the Islamic Republic’s excessive ambitions as an incidental obstacle.

Perhaps Friedrich Merz, the conservative German chancellor, unwittingly confirmed this third function more clearly than anyone when he stated [4]: “Israel is now carrying out this dirty war on our behalf”. Here, Merz implicitly acknowledged that Israel is a base for Western imperialism in the Middle East. An important complementary point that Friedrich Merz cannot or does not wish to articulate is this: for several decades, Israeli and Iranian governments have been conducting “dirty wars” against Palestinians and the Iranian people (and people of the Middle East) on behalf of all those imperialist powers.

III. Implications and Consequences of Israel’s Invasion on Iran

War, generally, kills and destroys, but simultaneously undermines the very foundations of human life, from the environment and natural resources, to urban and industrial infrastructure, and the essential social structures necessary for social-political struggles and resistance against the existing order. Beyond direct massacres and the immediate escalation of poverty and widespread deprivation, war—being closely linked to patriarchy—will worsen the overall situation of women* in many respects. More importantly, from a political perspective, war holds the future of peoples hostage by reducing their ability (and opportunities) to determine their own destiny. These threats are especially evident in the current war Israel initiated in Iran, especially regarding the fact that Islamic Republic’s despotic, reactionary, and patriarchal nature will intensify these catastrophic trends. Among them, this section focuses on trends/mechanisms that suppress or diminish the political agency (subjectivity) of the oppressed in Iran.

The IR not only facilitated conditions allowing Israeli regime—to impose this imperialist war on Iranian peoples with horrific direct consequences [5], but the war has also shattered the development of political agency among Iran’s oppressed, forged through decades of continuous, costly struggle under terrifying state repression. It has made the peoples’ living space in the Middle East more insecure, unstable, and fragile than ever, thereby paving the way for reactionary tendencies and policies to grow. Furthermore, by advancing military machinery, it has made this volatile area more susceptible than before to the rise of regimes based on militarism and political-security repression. Thus, a fundamental function of this war is to reinforce mechanisms that rebuild and stabilize state authority over oppressed masses during inevitable confrontations, regardless of how Iran’s future regime or rulers may change. From this perspective, the current war, with all its humanitarian, environmental, and infrastructural destruction, is the latest example of imperialist policies in the Middle East and the Global South, continuing the long-standing strategy of undermining the agency of oppressed peoples. Given that the foundation for any material hope for the salvation and liberation of Middle Eastern peoples lies in the revival of progressive and revolutionary agency among the oppressed and marginalized, we must analyze this issue in more detail.

a) Recent Foundations Shaping the Political Mindsets of the Iranian People

Understanding the tragic impacts of the current war on the decline and suppression of the agency of the oppressed in Iran requires a look at its historical background, addressing two interconnected points:

  1. Although the repercussions of this war significantly intensify mechanisms of suppression of oppressed agency, this suppression is part of a broader process rooted in older foundations of state repression and political suppression by the autocratic regime.
  2. Speaking of the suppression of oppressed agency (due to this war) does not imply the existence of a collective, homogeneous agency of the oppressed (with a progressive orientation) in their confrontations with Iran’s degenerate ruling system.

Instead, the consequences of the wartime situation (and post-war power scenarios) include:

  • Direct repression and the weakening of progressive forces.
  • The expansion of a climate of fear and public insecurity, promoting a reactive and fatalistic approach.
  • The dominance of this atmosphere, leading to dualities that sharply polarize society’s intellectual space and political mindsets, limiting or blocking the potential for the formation of progressive political agency.

In our view, while direct repression (and perhaps massacres) of revolutionary and progressive forces will be among the consequences of this war, the main repressive function of the wartime (and postwar) environment is to strengthen conditions that push the processes of forming political agency toward reactionary paths—the degeneracy of collective agency. This point requires further explanation regarding both the recent history of this degenerative process and its future outlook.

The rulers of the Islamic Republic, long confronting increasing contradictions and crises, have brutally suppressed popular demands and mass uprisings instead of pursuing political and socio-economic reforms. While the intensity of exploitation, expropriation, and structural corruption grew immeasurably, they persistently pursued strategies such as expanding militarism, nuclear and missile development policies, and aggressive regional interventions under the guise of “anti-imperialism” and “anti-Zionism”. This process, from 2017 onward, led to numerous mass uprisings, each met with bloody repression. The latest, the Jina uprising, was notable for its scale, geographical scope, duration, hope for change, and the intensity of state repression, surpassing previous protests.

The suppression and decline of these mass uprisings, especially the Jina uprising, fueled despair and passivity, which in turn amplified the influence of reactionary discourses such as monarchism, nationalist superiority, and chauvinism among opposition and discontented masses. In the absence of progressive forces and media (or their historically imposed weakness and dispersion), such tendencies and discourses were continuously fed by Persian-language media of Western powers and 24/7 TV channels affiliated with Saudi Arabia and Israel (like “Man-o-To” and “Iran International”). These powerful media outlets systematically and consistently responded to the suffering caused by political defeat and hopelessness with illusions of external salvation, channeling the anger and hatred of the masses toward the idea “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. The influence of these currents, especially during the Jina uprising’s decline—which was temporarily eclipsed by its inspiring peak—became visibly stronger. They not only accelerated the decline of the revolutionary momentum, heavily subjected to state suppression, but also, after the uprising’s ultimate defeat, became dominant discourses within the oppositional political space (both domestically and in the diaspora). During this period, the affinity between monarchist and partly nationalist tendencies of Iranian supremacy and pro-Israel sentiments (praising Israel’s conduct against Palestinians) became more explicit in public discourse. This was compounded by monarchist support for Western economic sanctions, as they openly expressed enthusiasm for potential US or Israeli invasions of Iran for “liberating” the Iranian people. [6]

In counter-response to this reactionary stance, another political discourse emerged, emphasizing the destructive consequences of Iran’s economic sanctions, the evident injustices associated with the dire Palestinian situation, and Israel’s uncontrollable tyrannies. This approach offered a full or tactical defense of the IR’s geopolitical strategy and its military expansion (nuclear and missile policies). This approach, however, contained heterogeneous layers: from staunch supporters of Velayat-e Faqih (the position of the supreme leader of the IR) or other regime loyalists—who, under the “Resistance Axis” doctrine, sought nothing less than Israel’s destruction—to moderate and even radical leftists, who, whether from nationalist or anti-imperialist positions (with overlaps), vigorously defended the Islamic Republic’s geopolitical and military policies. They viewed the Islamic Republic’s military and nuclear strategies as necessary responses to imperialist and Israeli aggression in the Middle East. Some considered these state policies a “minimal necessary evil”, equating criticism of them with neglect of national interests or susceptibility to imperialist discourse. Politically, they either directly or indirectly defended the IR, or, while tacitly or vaguely supporting social movements, prioritized opposing imperialist relations in the region, arguing that political problems with Iran’s rulers should not justify discrediting or undermining Iran’s geopolitical and anti-imperialist strategies.

Such contradictions limited the space for progressive opposition forces, already weakened and fragmented by ongoing repression, the legacy of political massacres, and the hegemonic spread of neoliberal discourse and policies. For example, the leftist advocates of the “Axis of Resistance,” backed by state propaganda, opposed their leftist opponents by accusing them of being “pro-NATO” (“pro-imperialism”), or by labeling them as “colonial leftists,” “regime-changers,” or “liberal left”. They considered mass protests manipulated by imperialist powers, or used some monarchist-oriented slogans and sentiments to discredit these protests and legitimize their own political stance. These tensions and conflicts intensified after the Jina uprising’s ultimate collapse, especially with Israel’s catastrophic war in Gaza, fueling polarization and political turmoil.

b) The Impact of the Iran-Israel Issue on Iran’s Intellectual-Political Space

After establishing and consolidating its anti-revolutionary power as a state, the Islamic Republic crafted its political-ideological doctrine based on Shi’ism, anti-Istikbar (opposition to the Western supermacy), and anti-Zionism. For decades, the Iranian oppressed have witnessed the same apparatus that responds to their basic demands with repression, imprisonment, and executions simultaneously raising the banner of defending the Palestinian people and uncompromising hostility toward Western and Israeli states, invoking verses from the Qur’an and Islamic teachings.

Since all opposition, protests, and mass uprisings in recent decades have failed to alter the oppressive situation ruling Iran, a broader social infiltration of certain ideological and political tendencies has been facilitated—tendencies rooted in the rejection of the foundations of the state doctrine. These include:

  • Secularism and even anti-religion (in opposition to a religious state).
  • Revivalist nationalism (opposed to the state’s denigration of such sentiment in favor of Islam).
  • Infatuation with Western models of socio-political and cultural life (in reaction to the state’s Western hostility and all restrictions of life-style imposed by IR).
  • Heroic defense of the “free market” (as an alternative to Iran’s flawed and crisis-ridden economy, largely understood as a state-economy).
  • Pro-Israel sentiment/attitude (due to the official anti-Israeli rhetoric and the state’s justification of its costly regional interventions in line with the strategy of “Axis of Resistance”).

In this context, discourses promoting anti-communism, anti-leftism, and broadly anti-revolution have gained widespread influence in Iran. These discourses initially began with a reformist fraction within the power structure of the IR, aiming to advance the neoliberal project and neutralize social resistance by promoting neoliberal ideology. They launched a massive campaign against leftist ideas and tendencies, later denouncing even the 1979 Revolution (and the very concept of revolution), considering it nourished by Marxist and anti-imperialist teachings. After the disgraced reformists withdrew from the core of power, they continued for many years within the margins of the state apparatus, leveraging their political influence and resources to expand these discourses (anti-leftism and anti-revolution). By blending such discourses with nationalism, they laid the groundwork for the emergence of monarchist and Iranian grandeur narratives; many former reformists even became theorists, activists, and advocates of monarchism.

As the influence of monarchist circles expanded, monarchists, alongside their other banners (racism against oppressed nationalities within Iran, xenophobia and hostility toward Afghan migrants, Islamophobia and anti-Arab sentiment, pro-Israel stance), adopted the banner of anti-leftism. Their stubbornness in anti-leftism was initially rooted in their fundamental opposition to the 1979 anti-monarchical revolution (as the “foundation of all Iran’s problems”). However, this stubbornness was also a reactive approach to the state discourse of the “Axis of Resistance,” which partly used leftist political language to defend the claims/narratives of the IR (like the liberation of Palestine), or support fundamentalist Islamic organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah as resistance forces. Furthermore, opposition leftist forces mostly expressed sympathy and solidarity with the Palestinians and, to varying degrees, opposed Zionist policies and the imperialist functions of the Israeli government. Accordingly, the growth of anti-left discourse in Iran became intertwined with the rise of pro-Israel sentiments.

As anti-Israel propaganda by the IR escalated and the public costs of the “Axis of Resistance” strategy—such as economic sanctions—became heavier for the Iranian people [7], pro-Israel discourse also gained more traction. Particularly, considering the repeated and costly failures of mass protests, the idea of overthrowing the IR by popular power seemed increasingly impossible, while Persian-language pro-Israel television channels continued to propagate their ideological narratives around the clock within this general atmosphere of despair.

Against this historical backdrop, Israel’s war in Gaza began; a conflict in which the IR was also involved through its guidance of the “Axis of Resistance” in regional turbulence. During this war, not only did the rhetoric of aggression and mutual threats intensify, but multiple military confrontations occurred, once again bringing the “Iran-Israel” issue and the Palestinian question to the forefront of public discourse. At this juncture, coinciding with the psychological aftermath of the Jina uprising’s final defeat, Israeli propaganda and its aligned media more openly and directly targeted Iranian public opinion than before. For example, Netanyahu repeatedly addressed the Iranian people, praising their struggles against the IR and promising “Iran’s liberation” to the discontented and desperate.

On the other side, monarchists and related political currents—more openly than ever—rallied in full support of Israel’s policies, justifying and distorting Israel’s war crimes in Gaza, with a significant portion of their active supporters/advocates welcoming the Israeli government’s genocidal and ethnocidal actions with Islamophobic and Arabophobic narratives. Despite all this, the fundamental objective linking the supporters of monarchism with Israel (to the point of obsession) was their shared opposition to the IR, based on the expanded influence of the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” paradigm. Moreover, this kinship is also linked to two strategic perspectives:

  1. Israel’s high military power and the tangible possibility of its use against the Islamic Republic amid rising tensions and military threats.
  2. The closeness of Israeli rulers with U.S. authorities as strategic allies, potentially paving the way for monarchists to seize power after the fall of the IR. [8]

Based on this, it appears that in the calculations of U.S. and Israeli rulers regarding the feasibility of a military invasion of Iran, not only has the pre-existing weakening of the Islamic Republic’s regional proxy military forces played a role, but also the possible welcoming reaction of the public to such an invasion by Israel. This is particularly true given that the mental and psychological climate of Iranian society was partly influenced by the paradigm of “enemy of my enemy is my friend” idea (though the disastrous consequences of this invasion could notably reverse this stance). On the other hand, the discourse of monarchism aligns conspicuously with Western powers’ preferred approach for reorganizing or reconstructing political power in Iran. Now that, with the full backing and authorization of these powers, Israel finally had the opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to its long-standing regional rival—the IR—if, as evidence suggests, the Islamic Republic approaches collapse, monarchism could become a suitable candidate for a top-down power transfer (regime change), at least in its initial phase. This is because they already represent many of the necessary factors for playing such a role: pro-Western orientation, fierce defender of neoliberalism, pro-Israel (pro-Zionism), anti-leftism, and highly “flexible” in power negotiations.

c) The Impact of the Iran-Israel (and Iran-Palestine) Issue on Iran’s Left Opposition

Within Iran’s opposition left, while solidarity with Palestinians and opposition to Zionist genocide and ethnic cleansing concerning the war in Gaza was generally accepted as necessary, how this protest solidarity was articulated in relation to the struggle against the Islamic Republic became a site of ideological and political confusion and conflict. Globally, the dominant discursive and political approach in internationalist solidarity movements with Palestinian resistance emphasized supporting Palestinian resistance and resisting the machinery of killing and genocide while sidelining Hamas’s political role and implicitly or explicitly recognizing it as the representative of Palestinian resistance. Meanwhile, Iran’s opposition left faced a dilemma in selecting among the following conflicting approaches:

  • Either set aside the political-ideological kinship between Hamas (and Islamic Jihad) and the IR, and practically overlook their opposition to the IR in the act of solidarity with Palestine (since, according to the dominant solidarity perspective, Hamas should be supported unconditionally as the primary force of Palestinian resistance against Israel.).
  • Or follow a more complex, though less acknowledged, approach to solidarity with Palestine (due to less support from Palestinian and Middle Eastern leftist currents).
  • Or adopt a passive, ambiguous, and ineffective stance.

This political dilemma—causing obvious confrontations and tensions among Iranian left forces (though not limited to Iran)—remained unresolved, especially due to its debatable theoretical-strategic cores [9]. Israel’s invasion on Iran and the onset of this imperialist war further fueled this political dilemma and the respective political chaos among leftists in Iran and the Middle East by intensifying existing conflicts and polarizations around certain dualities. For example, some of Iran’s left see Israel’s military invasion as crossing a red line that must be opposed regardless of the political nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran [10]. This stance, based on a specific understanding of anti-imperialism (and/or anti-Zionism), ultimately emphasizes opposition or resistance to Israel (as a warfare-state) while downplaying IR’s role in facilitating this war. Others, from the same starting point, invoke the “right to self-defense” of the Iranian regime, support Iran’s “standing firm,” or even advocate participation in a “national war”.

Overall, in the current turbulence of the war environment, the dominant discourses among Iran’s opposition left tend to emphasize a particular interpretation of anti-imperialism—focusing on the military aggression and direct role of the aggressor (Israel)—and support a radical, decisive response against political and media distortions of mainstream narratives. Although they rightly link Israel’s invasion (and Gaza genocide) to the necessity of opposing Israeli dominance and resisting it, they tend to abstract Israeli dominance and aggression from other contexts in the Middle East, such as the specific role played by the Islamic regime of Iran. Those views and approaches that also take the destructive role of the Islamic Republic into account to contextualize this war’s onset are often accused of relativizing or whitewashing Israel’s war crimes and equating the roles of the two states. This dominant approach echoes or follows a broader pattern within the dominant internationalist solidarity discourse with Palestine, which regards “true solidarity” as avoiding criticism of Hamas’s October 7 operation or questioning Hamas’s actual resistance role. In other words, the criminal nature of the recent war has activated a pre-existing polarization in Iran’s (and possibly the broader Middle Eastern) left, leaning toward adopting a firm, radical moral response against political and media distortions of mainstream narratives.

More or less within this context, the leftist advocates of the “Axis of Resistance” view Israel’s aggression as a justified reason for their own political stance, namely the legitimacy of Iran’s geopolitical strategies. Such a self-confirmation has notably amplified their propaganda efforts. The polarized and heated atmosphere, especially now, makes state-based discourse calling for “national unity” against a “foreign enemy” (and temporarily suspending struggle against the regime) more likely to attract followers—especially given the widespread awareness of the disastrous consequences of imperialist military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and beyond. Evidence suggests that some segments of Iran’s left are increasingly inclined toward this direction.

On the other side, parts of the Iranian social-democratic opposition (similar to certain liberal opposition groups) adopt a human rights-based anti-war stance, criticizing Israel’s invasion with varying degrees of severity, and rely on international diplomatic pressure to provide ceasefire and nuclear disarmament. As a result, the Israeli invasion has intensified the factional conflicts within Iran’s left opposition, weakening effective leftist activism and mobilization for anti-war, anti-authoritarian, and anti-imperialist solidarity. Consequently, even this horrific event does not seem capable of catalyzing a significant increase in Iran’s revolutionary left’s role in fostering pathways toward promoting collective, progressive agency in Iran’s political arena—although the dynamics of ongoing developments may someday open latent possibilities that could alter these trajectories. [11]

IV. Intellectual Challenges in Reconstructing Internationalism Related to the Middle East

Even if the flames of the current war, ignited by Israel’s military invasion, soon subside, its impact on the Middle East’s future remains profoundly dangerous. This conflict, regardless of its immediate consequences, normalizes war and the suspension of international norms, such as military attacks on nuclear facilities. When viewed alongside the ongoing war and genocide in Gaza, it reveals an unprecedented level of dehumanization, mirroring the global rise of neo-fascism. This trajectory inevitably sows the seeds for horrific future tensions, primarily by accelerating the region’s drift toward militarism and, consequently, authoritarianism.

Secondly, the direct impacts of this war, including the suppression of progressive forces, movements, and protests within Iran, create a political vacuum. This vacuum risks either the emergence and strengthening of reactionary alternatives, such as an imperialist top-down restructuring of political power, or the exacerbation of existing socio-political fractures due to intensified social crises and widespread insecurity. Such conditions could lead to confrontations among oppressed peoples, diverting them from collectively combating the foundations of the existing order, and potentially result in civil war and social collapse.

Thirdly, the war detrimentally impacts the future development of oppressed peoples’ agency in Iran and the Middle East. This occurs by:

  • Driving oppressed populations toward political passivity due to heightened economic and social insecurity, political repression, and security crackdowns.
  • Fueling nationalism and discourses of national grandeur, thereby promoting racism and xenophobia, by reinforcing widespread fear and feelings of inferiority and powerlessness.
  • Fostering Islamic fundamentalism, presenting it as Islam versus Judaism.
  • Amplifying anti-Semitism by exposing a severe aspect of contemporary global injustice regarding the unchecked power and practices of the Israeli state. This is because Israel advances its aggressive and inhumane policies under the guise of representing world Jewry, acting beyond norms and deterrents with unconditional support from global powers. Ultimately, Israel’s invasion of Iran, despite its guise of regional and ideological conflicts, fundamentally weakens the processes of forming class consciousness and anti-capitalist awareness and agency.

Given that this analysis primarily addresses comrades in the Middle East, we will now examine recent developments in leftist debates and practices concerning political intervention in the region. Our aim is to highlight internal challenges within the Middle Eastern left that impede the development of an alternative internationalist strategy. By critically analyzing a prevalent approach (exemplified by Iman Ganji’s essay), we contend that this dominant leftist perspective has fragmented and weakened the left’s political forces in the region, thereby hindering progress. To provide clarity, we first outline our own perspective, which we term “The Third Way”.

From our perspective, the recent conflicts and political polarization within the Iranian and broader Middle Eastern left [12] largely stem from several conceptual ambiguities and challenges:

  1. The intertwined nature of autocratic national capitalism with global capitalist relations.
  2. The nature and functions of imperialist relations within contemporary capitalism in the Middle East.
  3. How to simultaneously combat authoritarian and exploitative relations while also confronting imperialist dominance.
  4. How to effectively address the crimes and dangers of colonial-Zionist expansionism.

On a concrete and historical level, the widespread divergence and polarization among the Middle Eastern left reflect the structural contradictions of the global order. In the contemporary world, the reproduction of capital accumulation—the dominant system’s primary driver—necessitates both suppressing oppressed masses to curtail their agency and fueling militarized accumulation cycles. This process requires the reproduction of imperialist power structures and mechanisms at regional and national levels, primarily through the consolidation of autocratic powers reliant on militarism and despotism. Simultaneously, fluid yet inevitable conflicts of interest among imperialist centers manifest as fractures within core capitalist states or as regional proxy wars, influenced by concrete historical and geopolitical factors [13], including national, religious, and political divisions. The most visible expressions of these contradictions are shaped by the power mechanisms of imperialist relations, which are themselves affected by the fluidity and dynamics of interests among core capitalist centers.

In such a complex situation, the imperatives for reproducing the global order often emphasize conflicts among national actors and regional crises, rather than the systemic order that shapes and ultimately benefits from these conflicts. In other words, surface phenomena conceal underlying root causes. This applies directly to the roles of both the Israeli and Iranian states and their ongoing conflicts in shaping the current Middle Eastern order. Therefore, our challenging political and intellectual task is to identify the shared imperialist core of their seemingly contradictory functions, where the apparent forms of these conflicts mask the essential kinship of the political systems that manage them [14]. For approximately half a century, the advancement of the military-industrial machinery in the Middle East has largely relied on two primary engines: the Israeli regime, based on Zionist ideology; and the Islamic regime, rooted in a twisted interpretation of political Islam or Shia fundamentalism. Although these states have justified their approaches with different ideologies and have increasingly confronted each other over the past four decades, neither their ideologies nor their conflicts alone fully explain their historical nature or the recent war. [15]

Many leftist currents in the Middle East understandably emphasize the unchecked aggression and oppression of Israel and Zionism, along with the unresolved Palestinian question. The Gaza war and Israel’s invasion of Iran certainly validate this concern. However, a political problem arises when we attempt to transition from this legitimate concern to a comprehensive anti-imperialist, revolutionary strategy for the Middle East. If this strategy is to be more than mere moral righteousness or expressions of moral outrage—which are prominent in leftist approaches—we must demonstrate how the Palestinian problem/struggle is deeply and materially connected to the common problems/struggles faced/carried out by all Middle Eastern societies and peoples. This requires explaining how the mechanisms that have historically caused and perpetuated Palestinian suffering are distributed and intertwined across the region and globally.

Here, the necessary shift is from the particularity of the specific oppression manifested by the Israeli state to the universality of imperialist relations of injustice and suffering—which are shared and widespread. To achieve this, an inclusive solidarity approach is essential, rather than a particularist one. [16] This perspective holds that the distinction between theory and strategy does not negate the fact that a strategy’s strength or weakness ultimately depends on its theoretical foundation. For Iranians and other Middle Eastern peoples to genuinely express solidarity with Palestinians, simply identifying Israel as a common enemy is insufficient. Instead, it must be broadly argued and acknowledged that all regional states serve and depend on relations in which Israel is involved, thereby making them complicit, in their own ways, in creating the contemporary Middle East’s hellish reality, albeit to varying degrees.

To our understanding, The Third Way, contrary to superficial or distorted interpretations, does not equate the destructive roles of Middle Eastern states in perpetuating this “hell,” nor does it rely on comparative hierarchies of evil. Its primary aim is to expose the common roots of evil and injustice and the intertwined mechanisms of their reproduction across the region, thereby emphasizing the strategic necessity and possibility of united struggles. For instance, while the colonial Israeli state, supported by Western imperialist powers, has bolstered militarism and destruction in the Middle East with impunity, causing immense tragedies, the IR has similarly acted as a sub-imperialist power and reactionary regional actor with comparable functions, though sometimes in different domains and to different extents. The crucial point is that these two states have not only consistently reinforced each other’s roles and functions but their continued operation has fundamentally depended on each other.

Ignoring this fact inevitably gives place to state-centric or “campist” interpretations of anti-imperialism (e.g., favoring Iran’s geostrategic approach over Israel’s), and/or to nationalist or religious justifications —regardless of how much we emphasize “our hostility to the Islamic Republic [or Israel] does not need any proof. [17]” One of our strategic tasks, aimed at breaking the deadlock of anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggles in the Middle East, is to end the catastrophic monopoly of the IR and its allies on anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism narratives in the Middle East [18]. The immense and unchecked scale of Israeli crimes cannot alone justify or define the meaning and prospects of internationalist solidarity with Palestinian resistance when separated from the broader lived experiences of oppression across the region. Such solidarity, in practice, tends to be inherently exclusionary, and thus authoritarian, and fragile, being merely fueled by moral outrage. The internal contradiction of this particularist approach to Palestinian solidarity is evident in how it silences or ignores the roles Hamas and the Iranian regime have played in degenerating Palestinian resistance.

The particularist approach accuses “The Third Way” of “opting for moral purity,” “sitting between two stools,” “equating Israel’s agency with Hamas’s,” “relativizing” or “diminishing” Israel’s military aggression, “placing one’s own political and subjective experiences above Palestinians’ agency,” and even “being influenced by Islamophobia” [19]. Yet, it remains unclear what strategic advantage this particularist approach gains for advancing revolutionary struggles in the Middle East and Palestinian resistance by promoting the abstraction and detachment of oppressions from their broader context. While The Third Way encompasses many core concerns of its rival particularist approach—such as defending the Palestinian cause, highlighting the unequal nature of Zionist dominance, condemning Israel’s genocide in Gaza, opposing imperialist wars, and condemning the aggressor state—particularist comrades insist on “absolute and unconditional” condemnation of Israel’s invasion. [20] They claim, otherwise it would not be morally genuine or strategically effective.

However, mentioning and condemning Iran’s geopolitical strategies and policies does not impose a “conditionality” on condemning and opposing Israel’s military invasion; rather, it underscores the intertwined relations of dominance and oppression in the Middle East and the need for an independent stance in times of war and crisis. This raises the question of what the particularist approach aims to achieve by such an emphasis on separation. We understand this approach implicitly or explicitly seeks to postpone addressing the Iranian regime to focus on a perceived more important actor or urgent matter. Consequently, this approach would inevitably suspend the struggle against the IR’s mechanisms of injustice and oppression, which will undoubtedly intensify during wartime. Their justification for this abstraction often refers to the urgency or severity of the current war situation in Gaza and Iran. Yet, they do not clarify how this abstraction effectively mobilizes forces for an immediate end to war and atrocities, nor do they explain why such an ability would be hindered by the inclusive approach, which promotes linking struggles across the region.

Some advocates of particularism cite the risk of “civil war” and social collapse in Iran as a reason for postponing struggles against the Iranian regime during wartime, while focusing on Zionist and imperialist aggression. While such a dire scenario is not impossible, this argument implies that if Iranian authorities temporarily face no mass opposition pressure during wartime, or if international protests focus solely on Israel, there might be greater willingness among Israeli and Iranian rulers, or global powers, to prevent civil war in Iran or its transformation into a “scorched land”. [21]

Indeed, the approach we critically describe—contrary to its own claims—does not rest on prioritizing strategic considerations over theoretical concerns. Instead, it is primarily driven by the necessity to react defensively against systematic and widespread distortions by Western states, mainstream currents, and media. Its “strategic hope” is thus based on the legitimacy of the moral warnings it issues. To be politically effective, such an approach must operate in permanent opposition to mainstream discourses and claims, positioning itself to avoid any overlap with dominant narratives. However, since some overlap among opposing claims is epistemologically unavoidable, this strategy often requires a continuous shift toward outright negation of opponents’ claims and the proposal of counter-claims. The crucial issue, however, is how to interpret this overlap—not as a tactical denial or moral silence, but as an inherent part of the interpretive process.

Finally, the argument that the broad opposition to NATO’s 2003 invasion of Iraq succeeded solely by setting aside ideological and political differences cannot justify such unity for the current anti-war and anti-capitalist struggles. This is because:

  1. Ignoring the strategic foundations of certain ideological conflicts at that time, or pragmatically bypassing them, historically led to the emergence of pseudo-anti-imperialist leftist currents over decades.
  2. This kind of convergence lacked a rooted foundation in the actual lived experiences of oppressed peoples. Consequently, despite its inspiring aspects, it failed to establish a sustained, organized, and strategic tradition capable of confronting subsequent advances of imperialist military machinery.

We recognize that, following Israel’s invasion of Iran, the peoples of Iran and the Middle East, along with their future generations, face an acutely critical and dangerous situation. However, we must ultimately accept that in this tragic historical moment, no simple or shortcut path exists. It is impossible to reap material fruits that we, or our ancestors, have not sown or sufficiently cultivated. If, in the current war-torn and crisis-ridden environment, the commitment to oppose the intensifying suffering of oppressed peoples and its future expansion requires a degree of pragmatism and distance from distant political ideals, this pragmatism must foster collective cooperation and initiatives for protecting life itself and through that strengthening the collective, and critical agency/subjectivity of the oppressed. Namely, we must develop strategies and initiatives that enable oppressed peoples to defend their lives against life-hostile forces and mechanisms, while simultaneously promoting the ideas and material foundations for “organization from below.”

V. Notes

  1. We acknowledge that the term “راه سوم” (The Third Way) is ambiguous due to its varied thematic references and contradictory backgrounds within the left movement and related political literature. We hope this text demonstrates the necessity and historical rationale behind its use.
  2. Some recent reports suggest that the “sensitive documents and evidence regarding Israel’s nuclear and military facilities” were falsified, and that providing Iran’s government access to them was part of an Israeli government security plan.
  3. During the preparation of this article, Israel’s escalating military assaults have intensified the security atmosphere and judicial-security pressures in Iran. In this heightened wartime tension, the government has launched a security campaign to suppress opposition, propagating rhetoric like “treason to the homeland,” “collaboration with hostile forces,” and “collaboration with Mossad,” and has even executed several individuals on such charges. Simultaneously, by invoking the discourse of “necessity of national unity” amidst external invasion, the government seeks to legitimize increased criminalization, prosecution, and suppression of dissent.
  4. Friedrich Merz: “This is the dirty work Israel is doing for all of us.”.
  5. To grasp the magnitude of these horrific direct repercussions, it suffices to mention that, contrary to all international norms, Israel is bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, which could expose vast areas and large populations to radiation leaks and chemical contamination.
  6. Many prominent monarchist theorists and advocates were formerly affiliated with governmental reformists; some possess security and military backgrounds in Iran, and evidence suggests close ties between parts of Iran’s military-security apparatus and monarchist factions.
  7. The emergence and relatively widespread circulation of slogans like “نه غزه، نه لبنان، جانم فدای ایران” (No Gaza, No Lebanon, My life for Iran) should be seen as indicators and products of this context.
  8. Despite this, over the years, the Islamic Republic’s security-judicial apparatus has primarily targeted leftists, including independent labor activists and progressive social movement activists, rather than monarchists. This parallels the Shah regime’s suppression apparatus, SAVAK, which allowed Islamists to operate in cultural, social, and political spheres while severely repressing even the slightest signs of leftist activity and movements.
  9. Within Iran’s right-wing opposition, narratives welcoming Israel’s invasion as a means to weaken the Iranian government, potentially leading to its fall or even “salvation,” have notably strengthened. These views are widely propagated in Western and Israeli media and often presented as self-evident.
  10. Ein A smaller segment of the Iranian right-wing opposition has adopted a somewhat similar stance, albeit from a nationalist perspective.
  11. For example, with the increasing destruction and slaughter caused by Israel’s invasion of Iran, there are signs that some disillusioned masses—who, influenced by hegemonic discourses, had pinned hopes on foreign military intervention to “liberating Iran”—are now realizing the full extent of this illusion.
  12. The existing ideological and political polarizations in Iran’s public sphere mainly revolve around these contentious issues: the nature of the Iranian and Israeli governments and their relationship; the nature of despotism and the global (or imperialist) order; and the path and essence of a liberating political project. Within Iran’s right-wing ideological and political space, these polarizations typically manifest as debates over nationalism and the process of transitional politics away from the Islamic Republic, simultaneously reproducing the political divide between right and left discourses and approaches.
  13. These concrete-historical characteristics primarily stem from the legacy of national and regional histories of colonization and imperialism, and the formation process of modern nation-states, which were forcibly incorporated into the global capitalist system. Many countries in the Global South still bear socio-political fissures rooted in this history of domination.
  14. In common representations, Iran’s government is depicted as an authoritarian, reactionary, and repressive regime; Israel is portrayed as a colonialist and apartheid state. However, the shared systemic element enabling both states to exhibit these inhumane traits is militarism (in the broad sense).
  15. More specifically, a certain parallelism between two historical confrontations has pre-ordained these polarizations within Iran and the Middle East: 1) The Islamic Republic’s ideological and strategic doctrine, relying on opposition to global imperialism, Western democracy, secularism, and the Zionist state—given its anti-popular record and political deadlock—has made it attractive to the narratives, claims, and discourse of opposing states. 2) The continuation of catastrophic imperialist interventions and wars in the Middle East, coupled with Israel’s aggressive advance fully supported by Western powers, has indirectly contributed to the perception of Iran’s separation from the global domination system and its anti-imperialist claims. Alongside these, the political repression and societal militarization under the Islamic Republic have continually blocked the formation of associations, confrontations, and the development of political perspectives, hindering overall leftist engagement with society and among themselves.
  16. The prevalent tendency in recent leftist politics to prioritize particularism, rooted in recognizing differences, is a consequence of widespread post-structuralist influence. While recognizing differences is necessary and justified, it should not be pursued by ignoring the totality of social reality or by contradicting a Marxist epistemology.
  17. See Iman Ganji’s essay. (Six urgent points about the war against Iran, Akhbar Rooz, 28 Khordad 1404.)
  18. Group Roja (Paris): “Women, Life, Freedom” against war—A statement against Israel’s genocidal policies and the repressive Islamic Republic—Radio Zamaneh, 30 Khordad 1404.
  19. Such accusations are often accompanied by distortions and/or caricatures of the opponent’s reasoning.
  20. The discourse that justifies “absolute and unconditional condemnation of Israel” as an aggressor or war initiator—while rejecting perspectives that reference the historical context of this escalation, like Iran’s war-mongering—conflicts with the logic previously used by similar tendencies. These tendencies (correctly) emphasized the historical backgrounds of Hamas’s October 7 operation against Israeli and Western propaganda, yet the current discourse for absolute condemnation tends to ignore such backgrounds.
  21. Overall, Iran’s Islamic Republic, with its relentless and frenzied militarism, petty imperialist policies, and repressive security measures, has laid a path toward inevitable political collapse, threatening the disintegration of the entire social fabric: a form of “scorched earth” policy. Conversely, Israel and its global supporters have repeatedly demonstrated—including during the 20-month war and genocide in Gaza, and previously in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Syria—that the “scorched earth” policy precisely serves their interests and the “global war regime.”

Additional Footnotes (3)

  1. Roud Media Collective. Note that, as the Farsi translation of this essay was published on June 20, approximately one week after Israel’s invasion of Iran, this translation does not cover events that occurred afterward, particularly the U.S. invasion and the subsequent ceasefire.
  2. It is clear that the segment of political forces in the Middle East that has embraced the inhumane logic of states, viewing war and slaughter as a path to improvement and salvation, is not our audience.
  3. Regarding debates among Iranian leftists (Persian-language media), a condensed version of this approach is exemplified by Iman Ganji’s essay. “Six urgent points about the war against Iran” (Akhabar Rooz, 28 Khordad 1404). Consistent with the purpose of this text, the final part of section IV critically engages with Ganji’s essay. His clear and critical language offers a useful reference to examine a relatively broad leftist approach that this article aims to critique.
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